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ARMED FORCES

HEROISM, SHORTCOMINGS OF ARMY DOCTORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen K. Fedorov: "The Physician's Sincere Generosity"]

[Text] Many letters in our editorial mail are devoted to the noble labor of military medical personnel. In paying tribute to the professional expertise and competency of military physicians, the readers tell about the high ethical principles of those who found their calling in medicine, about their moral qualities and about relationships with patients, and they reflect on the physician's ethics.

The editors asked Lt Gen K. Fedorov, deputy chief for political affairs of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate, to comment on these letters.

We in the Central Military Medical Directorate also receive many such letters. Each time in reading them and reflecting on the human and moral aspect of the physician's profession, one probably arrives at one and the same thought: What a high and noble calling this is to be a physician, and how morally pure a person must be on receiving the right to wear the white robe. The moral code of doctoring formed over centuries. The methods of treatment and approaches to the patient changed but, as it is generally known, the pedestal to which people elevated the physician remained invariably high. Today it is not just the professional expertise of medical personnel to which primary importance is attached in our country. Society and all of us are not indifferent to their moral countenance, their ideology and their position in life. The letters attest that military physicians are people of high morals, conditioned ideologically, and dedicated to their humane duty.

"These events occurred at a health resort in Yessentuki," says Col (Ret) L. Rukavishnikov in his letter. "The relative of a woman worker at a military sanatorium was dying in a hospital after having recently become a mother. The physicians took her from a state of clinical death and operated, but the situation remained critical. Svetlana's life was fading with each hour. At this time Col Med Serv F. Novikov, chief surgeon of the Kiev Military District, was on vacation in the sanatorium. He was consulted and Fedor Grigor'yevich immediately drove to the hospital. After examining the patient he decided to

prepare her urgently for an operation. New Year's Eve was descending on the city but in the city hospital operating room the military surgeon was fighting for a human life for the fifth hour, and he won out over the ailment! Then for another 18 days after the operation until his vacation was over he was beside Svetlana, who gradually improved. When Novikov was thanked for saving the woman he responded: 'I didn't do anything unusual. I simply performed my duty...'"

As we see, there are drama-filled events behind this letter. How much moral and physical effort it took the doctor to return the person to life! The experienced specialist had an excellent realization of his measure of responsibility in that almost hopeless case and understood what the risk involved. People awaited advice from him and in that situation he could have limited himself to this. But had the physician done that he would have cast a shadow on the authority of the military physician. His duty and conscience did not permit him to do nothing. A physician is always a physician, both on vacation and on a day off. A bureaucratic approach (this is my patient and this one isn't) is inconceivable for him.

Here is what is typical. People often don't know the name of one who comes to them for help. It isn't for the sake of fame, but at the calling of their heart and moral duty that doctors fight for a human life, such as that nameless physician about whom war veterans P. and V. Levin write.

"We were returning home to Moscow. Suddenly my husband didn't feel well. They announced over the train radio that a physician was needed, and he came immediately. It is difficult to pass on in words how grateful we are to this person who assisted, soothed and called for first aid at the station. As it happened, we didn't even ask his first name in the confusion. We know only that he is a military physician and was traveling from his mother's home in Yaroslavl, and that he serves in Kazan. Perhaps he will read our letter and accept the words of gratitude."

We have become accustomed to seeing people in white robes hastening to a person in trouble. The doctor is ready to withstand any ordeal for the sake of saving his life. The military physician shares the hardships of campaign life and the stress of the training routine with the soldiers. If the soldiers are making a march, crossing mountain passes or fighting a practice battle, the unit physicians are next to them in the same formation.

More than 75 percent of unit physicians are young officers. The job of preserving and strengthening the personnel's health demands high ethics and civic maturity of them. Life today gives many examples of the selflessness and high moral qualities of officers with medical emblems on their shoulderboards, whether they are operating under Afghan rebel bullets in performing the duty of a physician-internationalist, or performing difficult duty in the taiga, the desert or the ocean.

...Without a second thought, ship's physician Capt Med Serv A. Solovey gave his oxygen equipment to a patient who was having an operation. He was awarded

the Order of Red Star posthumously. When an armed bandit dashed along a crowded platform, Lt Med Serv Sh. Akhmetov stepped toward the bullet, screening women and children with his body, just as at one time front doctors shielded patients from bullets and shrapnel with their bodies as they carried them from the battlefield.

And with what can we compare the heroism of those physicians who, in laying a path into the unknown, perform dangerous experiments on themselves, test new medicines and risk their own health by being at the bedside of an infectious patient?

In order to study a serious ailment and ease the suffering of lepers, prominent military surgeon Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Vishnevskiy spent three years in a leper colony hospital. To understand human physiology under high-mountain conditions military physician L. Orbeli, subsequently a colonel general medical service and academician, spent a long time in a submarine compartment without a supply of oxygen. He remained there even when he began to suffocate. Only after loss of consciousness was the doctor taken up--that was Orbeli's order.

The physician and the patient. They meet at minutes that are far from joyous. When a person feels poorly and is ill he invariably takes his trouble to the person in the white robe in the hope of assistance, understanding and kindness. People often expect the physician to provide, if not a miracle, then fervent sympathy and warmth. Strictly speaking, the medical worker begins with these best human qualities.

"After meeting a surprising person, Lt Col Med Serv Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Sarayev, I understood and experienced for myself that people are healed not only by drugs, but also by the physician's sincere, cordial attitude toward the patient. With what sincere sympathy our doctor awaits results of examinations and analyses and how happy he is when they are reassuring. Everyone who meets Sarayev is literally warmed by his kind heart." These are the moving lines from Capt M. Yatsenko's letter.

It has long been known that success of treatment largely depends on the physician's ethics, mutual relations with the patient and ability to inspire a person's faith in being cured. It is not said in vain that the hope of recovery is half the recovery, and a physician himself is the medicine. One can be a superb specialist and an expert in his field but not see beyond the analyses of a person. One can be an experienced surgeon, yet frighten people with a crude word. The problem of the relationships of the physician and patient arises especially acutely today, in the age of "technization" of medicine, when modern technology and EVM's [electronic computers] shorten the time of their contact. It is with the greater satisfaction that one reads such lines: "I immediately felt better after a talk with the friendly and attentive doctor, Lt Col Med Serv Yu. Markelov. This person, who possesses the talent of kindness, is able to find the necessary words and inspire faith in being cured," wrote Lt Col A. Podorozhnyy.

But alas, it also happens differently, usually in those cases where the doctor is moved not by love for his work but by egotism, career ambition and indifference. Here it is impossible to disagree with those letter writers who believe that it is inadmissible and cruel to be a physician at the whim of chance, for the prestige of this profession. People who have come across a negligent and at times irresponsible attitude toward the patient lodge just complaints toward medical personnel. Officer M went to Lt Med Serv V. Kovyazin for help as soon as he felt ill, but the physician treated him indifferently, to put it mildly. He didn't even consider it necessary to make entries on the treatment in the medical record. An ailment curable in our days caused serious complications as a result of the inattention and indifference toward the patient.

"At night my husband felt very ill," writes officer's wife I. Puchka to the editors. "His temperature was above 40. I got in touch with the hospital but the physician didn't come. I phoned there again and again until I got an answer from Capt Med Serv K. Teterin: 'I don't know where the physicians are and I also don't know when they will be here...'"

The physician refused to help. One doesn't wish to believe that. The conduct of such Aesculapiuses is amoral and strikes hard against the authority of other doctors who religiously perform their duty.

Maj Med Serv M. Yefimov isn't rebuked for callousness toward a patient. It is possible that he is not a bad specialist, but his conduct generates a negative attitude in those around him. The military physician obviously scorned his honor, one of the basic principles of our morality. He sent his subordinate medical assistant Yu. Kucherenko to run his personal errands and the medical assistant also worked at Yefimov's mother-in-law's place.

I recall in connection with this fact the conclusion of the aforementioned A. Vishnevskiy at which he arrived in his celebrated "Surgeon's Diary," written in the war years: "If I myself needed an operation and was free to choose either a surgeon who operated brilliantly but was relatively unstable in the moral respect, or a physician of average technique but a fundamental and honest person, I would trust the latter."

I believe that the thought that a physician must arrange not only his work but his entire life faultlessly sounds rather convincing in the words of a celebrated surgeon who has seen a great deal.

People's health is our invaluable treasure. "Everything must be done so the Soviet citizen always can obtain timely, skilled and sympathetic medical help everywhere," was the task set at the 26th party congress for public health workers. For this reason we must be intolerable toward any instance blemishing the high title of physician. Party principle and a high sense of responsibility must be an immutable trait of the doctor's moral make-up. Every patient must feel that he is being treated by sympathetic, responsive people. Every soldier must know that his health is being protected by people with a high sense of duty. Those officers in charge and party and Komsomol

organizations act properly in instilling in military medical personnel the need to always act with high morals and to be irreconcilable in the fight against indifference.

Numerous letters tell about the selfless work of military doctors. Although they usually are addressed to specific physicians, they contain the people's sincere gratitude to all military doctors for their best human qualities and sacred sense of duty.

6904

CSO: 1801/339

ARMED FORCES

LACK OF PREPAREDNESS FOR SUMMER EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 84 p 1

[Editorial: "In Preparing for Summer Training"]

[Text] Preparations for summer combat training are under way in units and aboard ships. This is a fervent, busy time of strenuous exercises, flights, cruises, firings and missile launches. Responding with action to the party's concern for further reinforcement of the Motherland's defense might in the face of the military danger which has risen through the fault of imperialism, Army and Navy personnel are full of resolve to make maximum use of favorable opportunities of the summer training period and take the combat readiness of units and ships and their own military proficiency to a new level. They realize that summer training concludes the training year and that fulfillment of competition pledges depends to a decisive extent on its quality and effectiveness.

As results of the inspection show, winter combat training became an important stage in improving Army and Navy personnel's preparation and in developing socialist competition. But deficiencies and unused reserves also were uncovered during the inspection. It is fully understandable that further progress will depend largely on self-criticism and exactingness in assessing what has been achieved. In preparing for summer training it is important both to pay due respect to those who distinguished themselves and to look thoroughly into why some subunits, units and ships did not fully accomplish the missions assigned them or attain the goals planned in competition. There must be a strict, specific demand placed on leaders who permitted the lag and whose work style did not meet today's requirements. Not only to preserve the overall mood to fight for a further improvement in combat readiness and for reinforcing discipline and order in all areas, but also invariably to go further and achieve more is one of the primary tasks of commanders, political entities, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations.

Fulfillment of this task above all assumes a high degree of organization and the precise working rhythm of all installations in the training facility. Proper steps were taken where the people set about to improve them immediately after the final problems. For example, preparations for summer training are proceeding across a broad front at the training center where Col V. Baranov is the chief (Red Banner Baltic Military District). All center

facilities are being organized in strict conformity with the requirements of guidance documents and with consideration for foremost methodology and the nature of modern combat. At the same time the people here also showed concern for improving the qualifications of the facility staff, which will permit improving the quality in operating equipment and avoiding various discrepancies in the training process.

But there are unfortunately facts of a different sort. Vacillation is seen in preparations for summer training in some units [soyedineniye and chast'] and aboard some ships. The Motorized Rifle Division "X" (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), for example, is slow in organizing the weapons compound for tankmen. Meanwhile the deficiencies in the weapons compound's work specifically were one of the reasons why many of the division's tankmen did not reach the goals planned in competition in the winter training period, but the division staff has not yet learned the proper lessons from this. Lt Col Ye. Mel'yanenkov, who is officially directly responsible for the training facility's status, also shows no activeness in remedying the deficiencies. Such an attitude toward the job is inadmissible. It is a matter of days before classes begin. This time must be used in the best way possible to improve the training facility, with orientation above all toward the extensive use of trainers and introduction of automated feedback and target display control systems.

Effectiveness in using the training facility and class quality largely are determined by the extent to which the combat and political training plan is conceived and supported. We must see to it in advance that it gives comprehensive consideration to conditions under which the personnel will have to accomplish assigned missions and to see that the plan orients people toward precise, rhythmic work and precludes various discrepancies and troubles in the training process.

More active use must be made of the experience of those who concluded winter training with the best indicators for the purpose of improving the training facility, planning classes, accomplishing the tasks of providing conditions for the troops' work, and arming all officers with foremost techniques of training and indoctrinating the personnel. Training methods courses, instructional methods classes, demonstration classes, exercises and other forms of command training are called upon to play an important role in introducing this experience. Special attention must be given to developing in commanders at all levels the practical skills of command and control, organizing combat actions under various conditions and organizing the training and indoctrination process, and maintaining firm regulation order and strong military discipline. The high ideological conditioning and professional training of everyone who must participate in the training and indoctrination process are deciding factors for successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned by the USSR minister of defense for the present training year.

The summer training period is a deciding phase of the struggle to attain the goals planned in competition under the motto "Be on guard, in constant readiness to defend socialism's achievements!" It is very important for people's

initiative and energy to find a worthy outlet and be directed above all toward accomplishing the primary tasks of combat readiness. Fuller use must be made of all channels which open up horizons for initiative from below. Not one useful initiative contributing to the attainment of high end results must be left without attention or support. In the period preceding the beginning of summer training we must take an attentive approach toward generalizing everything of value gained in the movement for foremost unit [soyedineniye] and in competition among regiments and ships.

During these days our entire life is taking place under the effect of resolutions of the February and April 1984 CPSU CC plenums, the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, and the theses and conclusions of program statements by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade K. U. Chernenko. It is the duty of commanders, political entities, and the party and Komsomol organizations to make skilled use of the personnel's high patriotic enthusiasm for successful accomplishment of tasks involving preparation for summer combat training and for mobilizing the personnel to struggle for new achievements in field, air and naval schooling and in the mastery of equipment and weapons. We must assure the personal example of party and Komsomol members throughout.

Preparing for the summer training period in an exemplary manner means laying a reliable foundation for complete fulfillment of socialist pledges and for a further improvement in the Army and Navy's combat readiness.

6904

CSO: 1801/339

ARMED FORCES

COMMANDERS' ROLE IN LEADING, CRITICIZING EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Nesterenko, chief of combat training department of the Red Banner Ural Military District: "Command Training: Demonstration Means Exemplary"]

[Text] There was interest in this problem not only because it was a demonstration problem. The battalion commanded by Capt A. Dzharbulov was showing an advanced methodology for weapons teamwork training of the subunits. How do the motorized riflemen usually arrange weapons training? The battalion commander takes one company onto the firing range, then another and a third. It is only in a tactical field fire exercise that he has occasion to control the fire of the entire battalion and use all weapons at the same time. Can't the training process be arranged so that personnel master all kinds of weapons simultaneously and the officers perfect fire control skills at the level of the entire subunit?

Capt Dzharbulov was to give an answer to this question. The demonstration problem was prepared through collective efforts. The initiative of officers from the subunit and from the regimental and division [chast' and soyedineniye] staff merged, and officials of the district combat training department understandably did not remain aloof.

Fire was conducted simultaneously at the unit firing range, moving target gunnery range and the weapons compound. The riflemen, machinegunners, rocket launcher personnel, gunner-operators of the infantry fighting vehicles, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile [SAM] gunners and mortarmen had their own training stations but they functioned against a common tactical background and accomplished a common mission. Capt Dzharbulov used wire and radio communications to control battalion fire approximately as it is done in a field fire exercise.

District commander Col Gen I. Gashkov, who attended this demonstration problem, gave high praise to the organization of the full-scale weapons lesson and recommended that the foremost methodology be used more actively in other units so that the experiment and search for new things could be taken up more boldly.

One can judge the effectiveness of this demonstration problem from results of the units where the recommended methodology has added to the commanders' arsenal. The personnel's weapons schooling and the officers' skills in fire control have improved. That means our efforts in preparing an exemplary, comprehensive weapons lesson were not in vain.

Unfortunately, far from every demonstration problem reaches the goal, for various reasons. At times an attempt is made to obtain an exemplary demonstration from an insufficiently prepared subunit, with an attempt made to eliminate deficiencies in its training by "coaching" right before the problem. But it also happens where the preparation of demonstration problems is assigned to far from the best methods specialists.

I recall in this regard one company tactical field fire exercise planned as a demonstration exercise by the regimental staff. It was being used to open an entire series of tactical exercises. Great hopes rested on the subordinates of Capt V. Dykhan'; nevertheless, it did not turn out to be a meaningful, interesting exercise. Mistakes were made in the initial area and the calibration of weapons and sights was not done entirely competently. The officers' actions had to be corrected when the subunit was moving out and deploying and during the control of fire. The company had difficulty reaching a satisfactory grade. What kind of demonstration could this be? The disappointment of those who were brought in to train from the company's example was fully natural. One could say they demonstrated how not to act in the field.

Just why did this happen? It was learned that exercise preparation was assigned to battalion commander Maj V. Zotov, who lacked methods proficiency. The regimental commander, staff officers, and chiefs of combat arms and services gave the battalion commander no help. They preferred the role of critics, as the saying goes.

The fact is that such a position conceals many dangers. If the regimental commander and chief of staff themselves do not prepare problems and direct them rarely, they gradually lose skills and confidence in themselves. At times, even if they wish to do so, they are in no condition to show just how personnel must be trained.

Not long ago I had occasion to come across a similar situation in the regiment where Maj M. Gadzhiyev serves. The request had been made here that a demonstration problem be held on far from the most difficult topic. We can't rely on our own resources, they said, as we have no experienced methods specialists. I replied that if you count only on outside help, then you won't have any experienced methods specialists.

It is legitimate to pose the issue as follows. The commander is called upon to be the most experienced methods specialist in the unit. Professional duty ordains that he delve into all methods innovations, test them under local conditions and constantly seek more effective training techniques. That is the kind of person I know Lt Col N. Mogilevets to be, for example.

At one time the tank training regiment which he commands was making poor use of trainers: the subunits were underestimating them. The commander was not about to persuade the young officers in words and so he undertook an experiment. The subunits which were preparing gunner-operators chose cadets with average grades in weapons training and a test firing was conducted with them. Its results naturally were not high and were as was to be expected. Then Capt Yu. Shakaryan began to work with the cadets on the trainers on instructions from the regimental commander. A new firing was held two weeks later and all the young tankmen received outstanding or good grades, thus progressing from average to foremost personnel. Can the real capabilities of modern training equipment be shown in a more convincing way?

The regiment doesn't limit itself to this. Demonstration classes on the practical use of trainers were conducted based on the best subunit, with the officers themselves in the role of trainees. Each person gained a feeling for himself of how much can be derived without taking the vehicle from the motor pool and without using engine operating time. Everyone particularly liked the trainer which allows the gunner together with the crew commander to perform all operations in succession from boarding the tank to firing an aimed round.

All training equipment in the regiment "began working" to the fullest extent thanks to the well prepared demonstration classes. This had a positive effect on the young specialists' schooling and on the growth in platoon and company commanders' methods proficiency, and it made the training process more economical.

It is of course important to prepare a demonstration class thoroughly but, as experience shows, this is still only half the battle. One must also see to it that the recommended methodology receives support in the units. New things don't find a home all at once: the supervision and high exactingness of senior persons is needed.

At times the advice and recommendations are left hanging in mid air, as the saying goes. For example, preparation of a demonstration morning physical training activity on the basis of one of the artillery units took a great deal of our time and effort. The class was successful in the opinion of course participants, but what was its actual effect? Time showed that it was modest. Only the enthusiasts who even before correctly understood the role of physical conditioning adopted the suggested techniques. Many other course participants didn't even try to apply the innovation in the units and subunits: it was a bother, it was difficult, and they weren't about to reproach people for deficiencies in physical training just as strictly as for omissions in tactical or weapons training. It turns out that it is not enough to demonstrate foremost methods techniques; one also must form an understanding in each officer of the need to steadily improve the training and indoctrination process and develop his inner need for creativeness.

This is the aspect of the matter to which we gave special attention during training methods courses and other activities in the command training system which preceded the beginning of summer combat training. We took the trouble to see that each demonstration class actually was exemplary, that it conformed to the principle of uniformity of training and indoctrination, and that it armed officers with the foremost methodology and practice of organizing competition. Now we see our task to be to bring the rank-and-file, routine classes as close as possible in quality to demonstration classes.

ARMED FORCES

CHIEFS OF SERVICES ASSAILED FOR OLD-FASHIONED APPROACH

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 84 p 1

[Editorial: "The Chief of Service"]

[Text] The tasks which the regulation imposes on chiefs of services are diverse and responsible. Combat readiness of Army and Navy forces depends largely on their ability to properly organize engineer, tank and vehicular equipment, chemical, and medical support of subunits and units, to supply them with all kinds of missile and artillery weapons, ammunition, fuel and lubricants, provisions, and clothing and administrative property, and to conduct finance work.

As always, the coming period of summer combat training will be filled with tactical and command and staff exercises, missile launches, practice bombings, and long ship deployments. Chiefs of services have to do a great deal in preparing and conducting them. They are obligated to arrange reliable support for units and subunits with everything necessary, to organize a timely check of equipment and weapons, and assure their skilled servicing and use so that the subunits, units and ships can successfully accomplish the missions facing them under all conditions.

The chief of a service is called upon to struggle vigorously for combat and mobilization readiness of the service he heads, for assuring a high level of the personnel's technical and special training, for maintaining firm regulation order and for making military collectives cohesive. It stands to reason that all this demands detailed political and military knowledge of him, a high sense of responsibility for the assigned job, and initiative.

These are the qualities inherent in the chiefs of services of units which attained high results in the winter training period. Among them are Engr-Lt Col V. Korshunov, Maj A. Savel'yev, Engr-Maj N. Boyko, and many others. Their contribution to accomplishing the tasks facing the personnel for improving quality indicators of combat and political training and for strengthening discipline is a substantial one primarily because they take a direct part in drawing up and implementing combat and political training plans and they conduct classes at a high methods level using modern training equipment. Commanders, staffs and political entities are showing genuine concern to see that the chiefs of services are the authority for all officers in matters of personnel

training and indoctrination and they are attaching primary importance to their ideological-political and professional growth. Chiefs of services take an active part in party-political work and in the life of party organizations. They are regularly included in courses, demonstration classes and other activities in the command training system which have become a genuine school of foremost experience.

Unfortunately that is not how matters stand everywhere. There are units where the commanders, their deputies and the staffs show insufficient concern for the professional development of chiefs of services and place little reliance on them in their work. Meanwhile, under present-day conditions their role in assuring fulfillment of the tasks facing units and subunits is growing more and more. This is explained by the heightened demands placed on personnel training and reliability of weapons and a reduction in time for making them ready for combat employment. But some chiefs of services do not consider this, they work in the old way, at times they violate the periodicity of inspections of the condition of equipment and weapons and their storage conditions, and they do not always skillfully arrange to provide Army and Navy forces with everything necessary. That situation is inadmissible. The commanders and their deputies have to place stricter demands on the chiefs of services for deficiencies in the work and objectively teach them methods for mastering everything new and foremost.

Arming chiefs of services with foremost experience of indoctrinating the personnel, with knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology and with the ability to influence people's awareness effectively merits special attention. It is important to see to it that the lectures, briefings, talks and political information sessions they conduct are combined integrally with individual work directed toward forming high moral-political and combat qualities in the servicemen and a conscientious, exemplary fulfillment of military duty.

It happens where a chief of service who is responsible for providing the unit with provisions and with clothing, administrative or other property believes that the range of his duties reduces only to this. If the people are fed, dressed and shod, he thinks, then there can be no complaints about him as the chief of the corresponding service and, with respect to training and indoctrination, these matters allegedly must be handled only by the commanders and political officers. The erroneous nature of such views must be explained. Inattention to personnel training and indoctrination matters and references to being busy and having an excessive load primarily indicate the officer's insufficiently developed sense of responsibility for the assigned job and his inability to arrange his work precisely. It is the duty of senior chiefs not to let such instances get by without bringing influence to bear.

According to the regulation, the chief of a service is obligated to provide immediate direction of combat and political training of subordinate subunits and to hold classes with the unit's subunits in his own specialty. This assumes the need to improve methods proficiency constantly. It is important that he strive in classes to have the specialists improve their skills of servicing and employing equipment and weapons under conditions of a shortage

of time and unexpected situations, i.e., specifically in that complicated, dynamic situation typical of modern combat.

The ability to arrange socialist competition well is of great importance for chiefs of services. Particular attention here must be given to improving competition effectiveness when conducting periodic technical servicing and equipment maintenance. The graphic nature and comparability of results and their broad publicity create an atmosphere of competitiveness and raise the intensity of military labor. It is also important to see to it that a solicitous attitude toward military and state property be instilled during competition and that people strive for economy of fuel, energy, and the operating life of combat equipment and weapons.

Army and Navy personnel are entering the summer combat training period with a high patriotic enthusiasm generated by resolutions of the February and April 1984 CPSU CC plenums and of the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation. It is the duty of chiefs of services to make skillful use of the personnel's creative initiative in the struggle for expert mastery, competent use and safekeeping of all materiel and on this basis to develop the soldiers' sense of responsibility for a further increase in combat readiness and efficiency and for a reinforcement of military discipline.

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ARMED FORCES

THRUST OF SUMMER EXERCISES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 84 p 1

[Article by Col F. Guz', Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Preparing for Summer Training: The Hot Range Routine"]

[Text] Col V. Baranov, training center chief, ends his story about his troubles with a smile:

"The farmers say that a spring day feeds you for a year. It is the same with us. Every hour or even every May minute is accounted for..."

As soon as final problems ended in the unit and the last subunit had left the training center work began in earnest on the range territory, scorched by shellbursts and torn up by tracks. The work plan had been drawn up in advance, which allowed doing each task quickly, with quality and by the prescribed date. Each day the training center staff would receive information about fulfillment of assignments. Electrification and engineer organization of new training stations had been completed. Periodic technical servicing had been performed on control panels, switchboards and communications equipment. The target display at the moving-target tank gunnery range and the moving-target BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] gunnery range had been tested, with the number of target display versions increased. The capacity of a number of training facilities had been increased, which will allow contests among companies, battalions and regiments to be held at the range.

Work beginning at the training center on completion of the training period always has specific features. This year great emphasis is being placed on preparing rail tracks for head-on and lateral target movement. Everything is being done in strict conformity with requirements of the Field Gunnery Course. Intensity also reigns at the training stations, where scouts, air defense personnel, medical personnel and the representatives of other military specialties will perfect their field schooling. Previously it would happen where motorized riflemen and tankmen would go out on the range while the personnel of other subunits remained in the compound, or if they did go to the training center it would be far from every class here that would be comprehensively supported.

"Conditions will improve for working lessons in coordination of all-arms forces and weapons," says Col Baranov. "There will be an opportunity to hold night problems and exercises more often."

The tactical field for field fire exercises is the principal training area on the range. Outwardly it is unassuming: ordinary, slightly hilly terrain with reference points and observation posts. Only the specialists know what a complicated technical facility is concealed beneath the ground: hoists, winches, electric motors, blocks for various purposes, and thousands of meters of cable... And all this has to function faultlessly.

A relatively small group of soldiers headed by Capt A. Saprykin works at the facility. They are not heavy on personnel: communicators, motor mechanics, radio installers, electric welders, drivers, crane operators. But each person is ready to replace a comrade and each one tries to be like platoon commander Sr WO [Praporshchik] R. Pichulis, who has mastered a good ten related specialties.

The brigades which include warrant officers V. Armonaytis, L. Verbanets and V. Tokarev work well. For example, Verbanets developed and introduced a light simulator of gun and machinegun fire under nighttime conditions. A device providing programmed control of the target display in field fire exercises was designed with his participation.

And there is one other innovation, in that all brigades are provided with communications equipment. Necessary tools, components and assemblies are delivered from warehouses, repair shops and laboratories at their request. This not only saves time, but also gasoline and equipment operating time.

Training center chief Col V. Baranov and his political deputy Col Z. Khayrutdinov set the tone for all the work. The officers are linked by long-time service together. Back when Baranov commanded a tank battalion Khayrutdinov was his deputy. The subunit bore the title of outstanding for three years and held first place in the district. At that time the commander received the Order of Red Star and the political officer received the "Combat Merit" medal. Later the comrades-in-arms served in different units, but just as worthily. Baranov was awarded yet another Order of Red Star and Khayrutdinov received the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class. Now they again are accomplishing the same mission, a mission on which the level of many subunits' schooling depends.

One can hear a good word about the training center in any regiment. One doesn't have occasion to waste time there as the equipment always operates faultlessly. The dozens of innovations tested here have spread to other district training facilities in blueprints and diagrams. And now work at the range has been set up in an exemplary manner. Everything will be in full readiness for classes by the beginning of summer training.

ARMED FORCES

LACK OF COMPANY PRESTIGE LEADS TO PROBLEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Aleksandrov, Southern Group of Forces: "Reflecting on Winter Training Results: The Company's Prestige"]

[Text] After familiarizing himself with the request submitted by Lt S. Yefanov, battalion commander Maj A. Novokshonov invited the young officer in for a talk.

"So you're requesting to go to another company... You don't appreciate the subunit where you serve?"

"The reasons are given in the request," said the lieutenant without shifting his gaze. "I consider them persuasive. And there is nothing to appreciate: the company is behind."

The battalion commander realized that words to the effect that an officer is obligated to perform duty where he is sent would not reach the platoon commander's heart at this minute. He had to go more deeply into what caused the request.

That evening Maj Novokshonov briefed me on Lt Yefanov's request. We began to ponder together just why the young officer was ready to part with the company easily. In fact it was not among the leaders and I would say that many had become accustomed to seeing it in last places in competition. A commander had been absent in the company for several months and acting commander Sr Lt V. Okunev was not able to mobilize people to fight for high results. Lt Yefanov's desire to introduce a breath of fresh air to the subunit's life and achieve competitiveness in classes had not yet found support in the collective. Seeing that the personnel didn't value the subunit's honor very much, Yefanov submitted the request for a transfer.

It was easy to reproach the young officer for the desire to follow the path of least resistance, but we were not about to censure him for anything. The fact is that responsibility for an assigned job and for the prestige of one's own company does not arrive of itself.

I recall the moment when Sr Lt V. Nikitin, the commander of 9th Company, was presented a challenge banner for first place in the regiment based on the month's results. Every officer, NCO and private in the subunit at that time felt like it was his own birthday. Now and then one would hear:

"Ninth will do even better!"

I also saw Sr Lt I. Aksenov at that time, excited and happy. At one time they wanted to transfer Aksenov to another subunit, and this disturbed the officer greatly. This indicated to everyone both on the battalion staff and the regimental staff that 9th Company was home to him and that his command development would be successful only in this subunit. They didn't transfer the officer, and during the days of winter training he showed his best side, especially in a tactical exercise.

Other officers are just as dedicated to 9th Company. For example, Lt G. Kislyakov hasn't served long in the position of platoon commander but when the opportunity presents itself he will emphasize without fail: "In our company..." And he does everything to see that there is exemplary internal order, firm military discipline and outstanding schooling in the subunit. The inspection for the winter training period convinced people that lieutenants I. Nurutdinov and S. Sokolov and WO I. Grinyuk are imbued with this same feeling. They achieved high personal results and prepared well for their subordinates' responsible test.

After those competition results were summarized Sr Lt Nikitin entrusted Komsomol organization secretary Jr Sgt A. Patsevich to carry the pennant to the subunit. The Komsomol leader went surrounded by colleagues. It was pleasing to realize that the people are proud of what was won in the difficult training routine and cherished the honor of their own company. This unquestionably is a stimulus for further improvement in the personnel's field schooling and combat proficiency.

The subunit's authority is the authority of each person who serves in it. A half-year ago the regiment's 1st Company, which is richest in combat traditions, began to surrender its position in competition. Its rolls eternally include Heroes of the Soviet Union Sr Sgt I. Nazarov and Pvt V. Tumor. The company is commanded by Sr Lt S. Fedosov, who prior to this served in a reconnaissance subunit. He is a conscientious person and a competent methods specialist, but somehow his relationships with the officers did not shape up. It seemed to some officers that the new commander was more concerned with his own prestige than with the subunit's achievements. The rather dry way of talking with subordinates and a tone precluding confidentiality in contacts with people all left an imprint on the state of company affairs.

In the middle of the winter training period we identified omissions in the organization of duty of the daily detail in 1st Company. At that time we advised Sr Lt Fedosov to think about how to establish sincere contact with subordinates and comradely relations with them, not just official duty relations.

When the staff officers and party committee members left the subunit after looking into everything and giving on-the-spot assistance, Sr Lt Fedosov called a conference. He demanded that the commanders of platoons where order had not yet been imposed work late and remedy deficiencies without delay. The officers regarded this with understanding, and only Lt V. Grebnev tossed out a comment: "But when will we rest?"

Had he heard such words the day before, I believe the company commander would not have restrained himself; he would have dressed down the young officer and perhaps even punished him for tactless behavior. This time Fedosov decided to have a heart-to-heart talk with the lieutenant so that he, like everyone else, realized the urgency of the work at hand. The company commander found the necessary words.

The conversation also was instructive for Fedosov himself. He saw that people in the company had been rooting and were rooting for its honor. A confidential talk held soon thereafter with Sr Lt M. Seregin, the most experienced platoon commander in the company, revealed a great deal to him. Fedosov knew that Seregin was a candidate for promotion (now he already commands a company) and so seemed to be performing his duties without zeal. But the frank exchange of opinions and especially the further joint work convinced him that Seregin cherished the reputation of his own company. He was the one who made many businesslike suggestions to improve the training process and political indoctrination work.

Having become closer and more accessible to the people, Sr Lt Fedosov uncovered for himself in a new way the character of senior company technician WO Yu. Boyko, deputy platoon commander Jr Sgt O. Il'in, and gunner-operator Pvt R. Ivanov... He learned to make better use of their positive example to instill irreconcilability toward shortcomings and a mutual responsibility for the subunit's honor in all personnel.

Now we praise 1st Company for regulation order in the barracks, for drill teamwork and for stable, high results in performing exercises.

Unfortunately we also have lagging companies. I make the reservation that before listing a particular subunit among the laggards we firmly ponder whether or not the staff and regimental party committee has done everything to keep the company from bringing up the rear. Are we performing work to see that the subunit's reputation cuts officers, warrant officers and all personnel to the quick? One often sees the omissions in answering these questions.

For example, staff officers Maj Yu. Pavlov and Sr Lt Yu. Yefimov often are in the subunit commanded by Sr Lt V. Sitnik in performing their official duty. As a rule, their reports always are cheerful: the specialists' schooling is improving and the state of military discipline is getting better.

One only had to delve more deeply into the state of affairs and the mirage of well-being was dispelled. People in the subunit had become accustomed to infractions of the regulations and were indifferent to the fact that the

company was in one of the last places in the unit. It is strange but, in justifying himself, Maj Pavlov said that he had not aired dirty linen out of concern for the company's reputation and good name.

But to safeguard the subunit's prestige means to create an atmosphere of healthy dissatisfaction in it over what has been achieved and a desire to go further, achieve more, lay the deficiencies bare without vacillation, and have the entire collective remedy them. Exactingness toward oneself is the supreme form of self-respect and a clear manifestation of responsibility for the honor of one's own subunit.

...I was an involuntary witness to the following episode at the final inspection for the winter training period. Lt S. Yefanov--it was his request for transfer to another company that forced us to ponder a great deal--reported results of a run to the range officer. The result was outstanding.

Calling the platoon commander over, I asked:

"Well, Comrade Lieutenant, what do we do with your request?"

"I'm taking it back, Comrade Lieutenant Colonel," responded the young officer.
"I realized that the company's place in the regiment also depends on me."

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WINTER TRAINING EXERCISES' LAPSES IN PREPAREDNESS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 84 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Ryakhov, commander of Red Banner Volga Military District: "Reflecting on Winter Training Results: The Depth of Analysis"]

[Text] Tank Regiment "X" concluded winter training with satisfactory results and in many indicators didn't achieve what was pledged in competition. The reports drawn up by the inspectors named several reasons for the lag, among which I would single out in particular the poor supervision by the commander and staff over the training and indoctrination process and ineffective management of the personnel's combat and political training.

We became convinced that this was so long before the final problem, back in the middle of the winter training period. I recall a talk with regimental chief of staff Maj A. Garshin, who according to the USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulation is obligated "to constantly know the true situation and status of the regiment's subunits as well as progress in their performance of assigned missions." Maj Garshin answered many questions diffusely and vaguely. He was asked, for example, how officers of the unit staff and headquarters were preparing to raise class ratings.

"According to plan," responded the chief of staff.

The district actually has drawn up a unified plan for preparing officers to improve or confirm a class rating. There is a schedule by months for all categories of specialists on how to arrange preparations, to avoid rush or crash work and to assure consistent accomplishment of tasks and a gradual, steady build-up in proficiency. But not one of the activities covered by the plan was accomplished in the regiment in the first months of winter training. The chief of staff's reference to the plan was groundless. Later, together with the regimental commander, he tried to give the excuse that tests for class ratings were a matter of the distant future and everything would be made up during the summer. It turned out that reliance continued to be placed on crash work. No conclusions had been drawn in the regiment from the fact that during previous tests for class ratings some 20 percent of unit officers did not confirm their ratings.

Some battalion commanders also didn't know the true state of affairs in the companies. Few of them were sure that subordinate subunits would fulfill all exercises and norms in control problems. But the fact is that the companies were being checked on matters already practiced by the personnel and evaluated positively by the commanders. Under such conditions can one speak of firm control of the combat training process? I think not. There was a serious discussion to this effect in the regimental party organization. And still, as results of winter training show, the tankmen didn't succeed in making up for lost time. The cost of a training hour today is so high that what is lost at the start as a result of insufficient organization and the ignoring of planning discipline affects results right up to the finish line, the end of the year.

"The question of organization and order," emphasized CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko, "is a key, fundamental issue for us." Our everyday practice, and results of winter training in particular, provide persuasive confirmation of how important it is to implement this party guideline persistently in all sectors, including the organization of combat training.

In order to improve efficiency, strengthen order and remedy "bottlenecks" promptly one has to have complete information about the state of affairs in each section: information that is honest in a party manner, adjusted, and extremely objective. This concerns management both at the regimental level and at the district level to an equal extent.

Last year one of the motorized rifle regiments which had a good reputation in the district did not fulfill competition pledges. Moreover, the motorized riflemen's results proved more modest than in other units. What was the reason? Why, for example, did the battalion commanded by Maj V. Korniyenko, which had been praised rather often, receive only satisfactory marks for tactical and weapons training and for combat vehicle driving?

At the beginning of the year the district combat training department held demonstration classes in weapons training and combat vehicle driving on the basis of this very battalion. District staff specialists explained to battalion officers in detail the features of the methodology they were recommending and showed how to apply it in practice. Those classes as well as the field fire exercise really did turn out to be demonstrative and greatly enriched participants of the district officer course, and battalion personnel in particular. District staff officers assumed that a reliable base for improving training thus had been formed in the subunit as in the regiment, and they relaxed attention to the unit for some time. There was no genuine supervision over the state of affairs there. That is why results of the final inspection seemed unexpected to many, while there was nothing unexpected in them.

It was learned that the ordinary, routine classes, so to speak, both in the regiment and in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Korniyenko were a long way off in quality from that exemplary demonstration class prepared through collective efforts. Doesn't the following phrase from the inspection report say

a great deal? "The command training plan in the regiment was not fulfilled..." And if half of the prescribed number of classes was not conducted, then no "demonstration" methodology will help.

The following deficiency also was identified. The regimental staff headed by Lt Col A. Arabina planned control classes in such a way that they didn't hit the target, figuratively speaking. The staff inspected the subunits in exercises which either had not been practiced or were practiced quite awhile ago. In one instance the deficiencies were deemed natural and easily explainable, but in the other instance it required a reorganization of the training process to remedy them, and this resulted in arrhythmia and a disruption of sequence in studying topics.

Serious work was done in the regiment to reinforce planning discipline, increase the sense of responsibility of the officers, and strengthen supervision over class quality. One can speak of its positive results. The regiment and the battalion commanded by Maj V. Korniyenko stood out as cohesive and trained combat units in a recent summarization of results for the winter training period. The unit's overall grade was "good."

The motorized riflemen's results would have been higher last year, too, had the omissions in the organization of combat and political training and socialist competition been identified promptly there. Nonfulfillment of the command training plan is not just a reproach for the unit staff. It is also proof of the ineffectiveness of supervision on the part of the large unit [soyedineniye] and district staffs. These staffs have broad opportunities to identify deficiencies promptly, uncover their reasons and take immediate steps to impose order. Unpleasant "discoveries" show up at the finale of the training year where supervision lacks efficiency and depth.

One other conclusion from this episode seems instructive to me. Each district has military collectives which set the tone in socialist competition and the district newspaper talks about them more often than about others. The leaders are made the example at meetings, conferences and courses. In such an atmosphere there seemingly is no place left for a critical view. At the height of training the company commanded by Capt V. Sukhoverkov received an unsatisfactory grade in weapons training in that same motorized rifle regiment mentioned earlier. The company failed in a rather responsible control problem. Isn't this an occasion for serious conclusions? But in this instance they were mitigated: Is it worthwhile, they asked, to cast a shadow on competition initiators? They surely will correct the situation before the year's end. But the interests of the matter required a different reaction. No one needs allowances or indulgences--there is only harm from them. The year's results proved this once again.

An example in competition means a great deal. When one unit has achieved more than another under equal conditions it is inexcusable not to direct attention to this, not to pay due respect to the leaders and not to use their inspiring example for drawing up the laggards. But in this work an embellishment of the truth, stretching a point, or being silent about deficiencies is inadmissible. Competition lives on publicity, objectivity and justness of evaluations.

The depth of analysis... In my view this is a very capacious concept. We often praise inspectors for their strictness. Strictness is mandatory for an official who is invested with the high right of supervision and evaluation. It stems from guidance documents, the spirit and letter of which are immutable for an inspector. But his task is not exhausted with the assignment of a grade. An inspector is called upon to be a person who possesses analytical thought, insight, and an ability to look both into the past and into the future of a subunit and do everything to see that the inspection results, no matter what they may be, generate a desire in the personnel to work more and better.

The inspection also is an art. An aid on the methodology of summarizing results of socialist competition and analyzing the status of military discipline at the regimental level, developed by the district political directorate, received good comments in the units. It takes account of the recommendations of a practical science conference held in the district with command and political personnel in management positions.

Assessing the state of affairs in a unit as of a given moment is not the most difficult task. It is more difficult and more responsible to draw conclusions about what this military collective will achieve tomorrow, whether or not it is on the reliable path, and whether or not it will achieve what is planned. Unfortunately not all the inspectors have enough ability to evaluate prospects, but this too is necessary. It is impossible to hold inspections often and have them complicate the work of commanders, political entities and staffs which are accomplishing their tasks correctly.

There is no real analysis without detailed, generalizing conclusions. I recall in this connection the unit which was commanded until recently by Col P. Dyagilev. Several years ago the regiment was the talk of the town, as the saying goes. One constantly heard rebukes of the commander such as: Just when will he finally begin to get down to business? In the opinion of some inspectors, Dyagilev was "spreading himself thin" on details and tying himself up excessively in arranging everyday regimental life. I remember that after one of the inspections the regimental commander and his political deputy Lt Col V. Zhur were criticized sharply for the fact that they allegedly "arrived at the idea of engaging in construction of a new boiler room and enlisted men's teahouse and the organization of flowerbeds inopportunely." Somehow it was ignored that with the old, low-capacity boiler room the temperature in the barracks in winter drops enormously below that prescribed by regulations and that this could not help but reflect on training effectiveness. The teahouse and flowerbeds seemed to the inspector to be capricious, although in the final account they also are related to combat readiness.

Meanwhile, as it built up and improved everyday conditions, the regiment augmented successes in combat training from year to year and from inspection to inspection, until last year it won the title of outstanding. The path to this title was difficult, but I always understood the position of Col Dyagilev and Lt Col Zhur, who believed that the regiment invariably would arrive at such high goals. They realized that the people's mood also means a great deal and

they tried to make the regiment a home for the soldiers and to have everyday life meet modern demands. Personnel responded to the concern for themselves with zeal and selflessness in training. Results of winter training convince us of this.

Today's results indicate a great deal about the work style of the military leader; a great deal, but not everything. It was emphasized at the February 1984 CPSU CC Plenum that in accomplishing today's tasks we are creating preconditions for attaining enormously higher goals in the future. This is also correct with respect to our Army life. In inspecting the state of affairs in a unit or subunit, it is also impossible to think about such preconditions and about the desire of commanders, political officers, and officers of staffs and services to lay groundwork for the future and lay the foundation of tomorrow's achievements.

Preparations for summer training are being completed in the units. Ahead lie intensive exercises, flights, firings and missile launches. The results of summer training, which means of the entire training year, and the fate of competition pledges will depend on the ability of leaders of all ranks to analyze what has been achieved daily, to evaluate it exactly and to correctly determine the paths for perfecting combat proficiency.

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ARMED FORCES

GEN S. P. IVANOV ON IMPORTANCE OF NORMANDY LANDINGS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 84 p 3

[Article by Army Gen S. P. Ivanov, front chief of staff in June 1944: "Fact and Fiction About the Opening of a Second Front in Europe"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Preparations are expanding in the West for the 40th anniversary of the landing of Anglo-American forces on the shore of Northern France, in Normandy, which occurred on 6 June 1944. As foreign press agencies report, it is planned to give this event special scope. The arrival of U.S. President R. Reagan at Normandy is expected. The mass media are publishing details of operations by allied forces in an attempt to depict them as the deciding factor of World War II.

The allied Normandy landing operation marked the beginning of creation of a second front in Europe. The front was called "second" because the Soviet-German front was the first and primary front of armed struggle. The primary efforts of states of the fascist bloc were concentrated here, decisive military events occurred here, the Hitlerites' strategic doctrines and plans fell apart and collapsed here, and here is where the dawn of victory over fascism began to gleam. The Soviet Union was the chief force blocking German fascism's path toward enslaving the entire world. In fact for three years the Red Army and all the Soviet people fought a selfless, one-on-one struggle against the enemy. The Soviet-German front remained the first, chief and decisive front throughout all World War II.

It was only the defeats of Hitler Germany at the Soviet-German front that forced western participants of the anti-Hitler coalition to begin landing their troops in France in the summer of 1944.

Ruling circles of the United States and other western countries attempt to turn the question of the importance of the second front to the victory over fascism into a subject of ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. In connection with the 40th anniversary of the Normandy landing operation they again are not letting up in attempts to justify their course of those years in delaying the opening of a second front. By distorting historical facts they are gambling on understating the USSR's deciding role in liberating Europe from the fascist yoke and erasing from people's awareness the deep sympathy which they nourish for the Soviet Union and its heroic Red Army.

The attempt by the United States and other NATO countries to falsify history stems from their present aggressive course. Bourgeois propaganda interprets the historic liberation mission of the Soviet Union in Europe falsely in an attempt to pass it off as an expansion of the sphere of "communist influence."

The events of 1944 themselves are the best refutation of fabrications by the falsifiers of history.

I.

An exaggeration of the military role of the Normandy operation is one of the directions of the falsification. What was its true importance in the course of the war?

From the first days of Hitler Germany's attack on the USSR the Soviet government considered it necessary to mobilize and coordinate the military efforts of all states acting against the fascist bloc. A second front in Europe could have been the most important step in this direction. Its timely establishment would have brought the victorious conclusion of the world war and liberation of enslaved nations considerably closer.

The question of opening a second front was a subject of discussion among governments of the USSR, United States and England in 1941, 1942 and 1943, but the British and American governments did not keep their promises about opening a second front. Their line of delaying the opening of a second front was a result of an attempt by the ruling circles of these countries to bleed the Soviet Union dry as much as possible. They wished to preserve their armed forces at the USSR's expense, employ them in the European Theater of Military Operations only in the final phase of the war and, after Germany's defeat, to act from a position of strength with respect to the Soviet Union as well.

The absence of a second front in Europe made it possible for Hitler's command to concentrate an enormous quantity of troops, equipment and weapons against the Soviet Union. For example, in the summer of 1943 it undertook a powerful offensive in the Kursk Bulge, where one of the largest and fiercest battles in the entire history of World War II unfolded. It was only thanks to the Red Army's increased might and the heroism of its soldiers that this battle ended with a major defeat of the Hitlerites. The victory at Kursk and subsequent offensive actions by Soviet forces led to a radical turning point not only in the course of the Great Patriotic War, but in the course of World War II as a whole.

It became clear to ruling circles of the United States and England that even without a second front the Soviet Army could complete the defeat of fascist Germany one on one and liberate the nations of Europe on its own. This circumstance finally forced them to undertake to open a second front. It was announced to the Soviet Union at the Teheran Conference of the heads of the three great powers in November 1943 that there would be a landing of Anglo-American troops in Northern France in May 1944.

Preparations for the invasion of Northern France continued for 2½ years under exceptionally favorable conditions, created above all by the actions of Soviet troops. The operation plan (codenamed Overlord) envisaged a landing on the coast of Normandy, which was convenient for the direct landing of troops on shore from landing ships. It was also important that the German command expected the invasion at another location (on the coast of the Strait of Dover), kept more troops there and set up a stronger defense there. At the same time, the antilanding defense of the Normandy coast was shallow, being a system of strongpoints without close fire coordination. There were permanent emplacements only in certain sectors.

The allied expeditionary forces numbered some 2.9 million by the beginning of Operation Overlord. They had a significant superiority over opposing fascist German forces: threefold in personnel, tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery], more than twofold in guns and mortars, and a little over 60 times more warplanes. We will note that the ratio of forces at the Soviet-German front was different by this time, which is apparent from the following table:

Composition of Belligerents' Forces and Weapons by June 1944

Belligerents		Ground Forces Personnel, Thousands	Tanks and SAU (Assault Guns), Thousands	Guns and Mortars, Thousands	Warplanes
Soviet-German Front	Soviet Forces	6,600	7.1	98.1	12,900
	Fascist German Forces	4,300	7.8	59	3,200
	Ratio	1.5:1	1:1.1	1.6:1	4:1
Second Front	Allied Expeditionary Forces	1,600	6	15	10,859
	Fascist German Forces	526	2	6.7	160
	Ratio	3:1	3:1	2.2:1	61.4:1

It should be considered that some of the troops of the Third Reich and its satellites were diverted to putting down the liberation movement which unfolded on territory of Europe occupied by fascist Germany. The nations of Yugoslavia and soldiers of its People's Liberation Army fought heroically against Hitlerite invaders. Underground patriots in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and the participants of antifascist resistance in other countries fought the enemy courageously. Units [soyedineniye and chast'] of the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet Army personnel against a common enemy.

On the morning of 6 June 1944 the Anglo-American forces made an assault crossing of the English Channel and began to land amphibious and airborne assault forces on the coast of Normandy. Some 4,500 assault landing craft and up to 2,500 warships, auxiliary vessels and transports were used to support the landing. The operation was supported by more than 10,000 warplanes. There were 2,000 transport aircraft and almost 2,600 gliders brought in for the airborne landing. The total number of allied troops in the beachhead was more than 875,000 by 30 June. Some 150,000 transport vehicles and 570,000 tons of cargo were delivered for them.

Having created a multiple superiority, the American 1st Army, British 2d Army and Canadian 1st Army, a total of 32 divisions, began the offensive, which developed slowly. It was only by 25 August that allied troops arrived at the Seine and Loire rivers. American and French troops landed simultaneously in Southern France and began to advance to the north supported by Resistance forces. On 19 August an antifascist armed rebellion was begun in Paris by French patriots, among whom communists played a leading role. After abandoning France in early September the fascist German troops withdrew to the western border of Germany and assumed a defense along the Siegfried Line.

The allied grouping of more than two million stopped in front of this defensive line, which was covered by some 700,000 German officers and men. The allies displayed indecisiveness and limited themselves to conducting minor offensive operations in the fall of 1944.

In giving a positive appraisal on the whole to the Normandy operation as the largest landing operation of World War II, it should be noted that the allied command was able to accomplish a number of difficult military missions: in particular, assuring secrecy of preparations and surprise in the landing, assuring coordinated actions of large naval, air and ground forces in the invasion and during the fight for the beachhead, moving an enormous quantity of military cargo and troops across the English Channel to the open beach in compressed periods of time, and the construction of special facilities (man-made ports, oil pipelines) for supporting the troops.

But there also were substantial deficiencies in the allies' actions. Despite enormous power of aviation and shipboard guns and weak enemy resistance, the average daily rate of troop advance in the first days of the landing remained extremely low and did not exceed 600-700 m per day. The allied command was not fully able to implement the intended plan of cutting off the enemy's withdrawal route beyond the Seine, and encircling and destroying him. The most combat-effective fascist German divisions managed to break out of the so-called "Falaise pocket" and withdraw beyond the Seine.

II.

Attempts by western falsifiers to show that the front opened in Europe in 1944 became the primary front and thus to belittle the significance of the Soviet-German front and degrade the Soviet Army's role in the defeat of Hitler Germany are completely groundless. Let's refer to the facts.

Above all, neither the Normandy landing operation nor the subsequent offensive by allied forces would have been possible had the Hitlerites not suffered enormous losses as a result of the Soviet Army's active combat operations in the period preceding them. As early as June-December 1941 the enemy had been deprived of more than a million men and a large amount of military equipment. From November 1942 to the end of 1943 alone he lost 2.6 million men, 14,300 aircraft, 7,000 tanks and 17,000 guns and mortars. It was impossible to restore such losses. In a little over four months of winter and spring of 1944 the Soviet Army completely destroyed more than 30 enemy divisions and routed some 12 divisions. The enemy lost more than one million men, 20,000 guns and mortars, 8,400 tanks and assault guns and around 5,000 aircraft. Hitler's plan to extend the war and win time through a strategic defense was disrupted. The fascist command did not succeed in carrying out its intent of strengthening the defense in the West.

All this largely predetermined the successful invasion of Northern France by the Allies.

By mid-1944 there were 240 divisions, or some 62 percent of all divisions existing in the active armies of fascist Germany and its satellites, at the Soviet-German front, which continued to be the deciding front of the war. The most significant operations not only in scope and number of participating troops, but also in results of armed struggle and their political consequences, were conducted here.

The Belorussian strategic offensive operation by Soviet troops, one of the largest in World War II, became the chief event of mid-1944. After penetrating the defense along almost a 500 km front, they attacked in a zone 1,100 km wide and advanced to the West up to 500-600 km. The enemy was deprived of more than a half-million officers and men. The Hitlerites were forced to shift 46 divisions and 4 brigades here from the West to close the enormous breach formed in the center of the Soviet-German front on the shortest axis to Berlin.

All army groups operating at the Soviet-German front suffered serious losses or were routed during the successful offensive operations of 1944. There were 127 enemy divisions and 30 brigades routed or annihilated, and 361 divisions and 23 brigades lost from 50 to 75 percent of their fighting strength. Fascist Germany was deprived of almost all its allies and was in total isolation. The front had approached its borders, and in East Prussia already had crossed them.

And so Hitler Germany's fate essentially was decided as a result of the crushing blow by Soviet troops in 1944. West German historian K. Rieker correctly noted: "When the western allies undertook the decisive offensive against 'fortress Europe' in the summer of 1944, the outcome of World War II practically already had been decided by Germany's defeat in Russia. . . . Germany lost World War II in the military sense even before the West's invasion."

And although the opening of the second front was a substantial contribution to the common cause of nations of the anti-Hitler coalition, it didn't change the deciding importance of the Soviet-German front, which continued to pin down

the primary and most combat-effective forces of the fascist bloc. Of the 5.4 million officers and men in the army in the field, fascist Germany was keeping 3.5 million, or some 65 percent, at the Soviet-German front by the beginning of 1945.

The great scope and continuity of offensive actions by the Soviet Armed Forces were supported by the increased economic and military potential of the socialist country. The Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of victories. The work of the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo, the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its working entity--the General Staff--was all-encompassing in managing the front and rear. As in previous years, efforts of the party and people were directed toward accomplishing the primary task of the most rapid defeat of the aggressor and a victorious conclusion to the war.

III.

An analysis of the military and political significance of the landing by the allied expeditionary forces in Normandy and the opening of a second front in Europe leads us to certain conclusions and permits learning certain lessons. What are the most important ones?

FIRST. Only the collective efforts of nations and countries and of everyone who cherishes peace can prevent a world war and decisively curb the warmongers. World War II experience is an example of this. It was then, in the period of mortal danger hanging over the world, that an alliance of states with differing social systems--the anti-Hitler coalition--was formed through the Soviet Union's initiative. The effectualness and effectiveness of this alliance was reinforced with the opening of the second front in Europe.

The danger of the present course of development of world events threatening the very existence of mankind demands from nations of the globe supreme vigilance, even greater solidarity and vigorous actions against military preparations by the forces of imperialism and reaction headed by the United States. No aggressive forces will be able to withstand the combined efforts of peace-loving states and nations, and those adventuristic circles of imperialism which dream of turning the course of history backward by force must constantly remember this lesson. The results of World War II are a formidable warning to those who foster vain dreams about world domination.

Recognizing its responsibility for world destinies, the Soviet Union is countering the aggressive forces of imperialism and their strategy of splitting the world into opposing military-political groupings with a policy of cooperation of all countries in the interests of preventing war and preserving and strengthening peace and collective security in Europe and Asia. Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed that "the Soviet Union is ready for broad and active cooperation with all states and with all peaceloving public forces in the struggle to reduce military danger and strengthen peace."

Consolidation of the efforts of peaceloving forces is especially necessary in the face of the challenge by aggressive circles of imperialism, who have declared a "crusade" against socialism, peace and progress. The scattered nature of antiwar forces and their passiveness with respect to the potential aggressor leads to a growth of adventurism in his politics and to reinforcement of the danger of war.

SECOND. It is the ability to wage joint actions against a common danger. The experience of military-political cooperation of states in the anti-Hitler coalition is valuable: an examination of the most important issues at conferences of the heads of governments of the Soviet Union, United States of America and Great Britain with the participation of representatives of supreme military staffs; an exchange of military-political information; joint resolution of fundamental issues in estimating the international situation and prospects for development of armed struggle; and coordination of the most important operations in the concluding stage of the war.

THIRD. The effectiveness of the military-political cooperation of participants in the anti-Hitler coalition was weakened by the discrepancy of their political goals in the war. Heads of the United States and England did not reject enmity toward the socialist system even in that dangerous time for the fate of mankind. They did much to see that the USSR arrived at the end of the war at the limit of its forces and capacities and so that they could dictate their will to the USSR and other nations of European states in postwar years. This contains the answer to the question of why a second front was not opened in Europe in 1941, 1942, or in 1943, but only in mid-1944, when the fate of fascist Germany had been predecided by the crushing blows of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOURTH. Without regard for past lessons and plunging the experience of cooperation between the USSR and United States during World War II into oblivion, the Reagan administration is relying on military force and on the attainment of military superiority. This path of confrontation under conditions of the race of nuclear arms and the conversion Western Europe into a nuclear arsenal and a launching pad for the American Pershings and cruise missiles threatens the peace won through enormous efforts and sacrifices.

By relying on the most reactionary circles in the FRG and supporting and heating up revanchist sentiments there, Washington is encouraging and accelerating militarization of a country from whose territory world wars were unleashed twice. Washington is aiming the American first-strike nuclear weapons stationed there against yesterday's ally in the anti-Hitler coalition.

Forty years have gone by since the landing of allied troops in Normandy and the opening of a second front in Europe. Assessing this important event in World War II on its merits, at the same time we cannot forget the intrigues of those imperialist circles of the United States and England who sabotaged the opening of a second front. It was their fault that World War II dragged on, which cost many, many victims.

The Soviet Union withstood the most severe ordeals with honor and came out of the war a victor. Socialism became firmly established and now there is no force which could halt its victorious procession on the planet. The Warsaw Pact Organization--the military-political defensive alliance of countries of socialism--stands reliably on guard over the revolutionary achievements of countries in the socialist community.

While paying a sacred tribute to the memory of British, American, French and other soldiers of allied troops and participants of the Resistance movement who died in the struggle against fascism, Soviet citizens call on all world nations today to rally even closer in a struggle against the crafty plans of imperialism and the reaction and against the inciters of a new world war.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

MARSHAL OF SIGNAL TROOPS I. T. PERESYPKIN PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun 84 p 4

[Article by Mar Sig Trps A. Belov, Chief of Signal Troops of USSR Armed Forces: "80th Anniversary of Birth of Mar Sig Trps I. T. Peresyphkin: A Talented Organizer"]

[Text] Among the many people with whom I have had occasion to work hand in hand in different years in deciding issues of the organization of communications, Ivan Terent'yevich Peresyphkin holds a special place. A prominent military leader and talented organizer, he was and remains an example for all military signalmen.

This remarkable person, brought up by the Communist Party, in which he was a true son and active fighter until his last breath, had an interesting and enviable career. The son of a miner, he himself became a miner at age 13. At age 15 he volunteered for the Red Army and took part in fighting against the White Guards at the Southern Front. While not yet 35 years old Peresyphkin was USSR People's Commissar of Communications and after a little more than a year, a month after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, being the People's Commissar of Communications, he was appointed deputy people's commissar of defense and chief of the Red Army Communications Directorate and later the Red Army Communications Main Directorate.

Of course, before taking over the people's commissariat and becoming chief of communications of the Red Army, Ivan Terent'yevich went through a good school of life and received a firm conditioning. After completing the Kiev Military-Political School in 1924 he served in the Red Army as a political fighter, squad commander, saber squadron politruk, military commissar and then commander of a separate communications squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division. After completing the command faculty of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Military Electrical Engineering Academy in 1937 he was appointed military commissar of the Scientific Research Institute of Communications, and from 1938 through May 1939 he worked as military commissar and deputy chief of the Red Army Communications Directorate.

Nevertheless, let's picture the time when the Motherland entrusted Peresyphkin with the responsible post of Red Army chief of communications. It was the

first months of the war, with the situation at the fronts serious and not always clear. There were troubles with communications in the headquarters of fronts, armies and units [soyedineniye and chast']. Departmental barriers hindering the prompt resolution of many issues in the organization and use of all kinds of communications in the interests of military command had to be eliminated as quickly as possible and replacements had to be provided to the signal units and subunits which had suffered losses... All these and many other tasks fell on the shoulders of the new chief of communications and his assistants. The uncommon organizing abilities and talent of a leader were needed to make things work as the situation demanded it. These qualities showed up clearly in Ivan Terent'yevich's work.

After being appointed chief of communications on 23 July 1941 he took part, together with General Staff workers, in drawing up the draft order "Improving Communications in the Red Army" that same day. That night the document, signed by I. V. Stalin, was transmitted over teletype to the headquarters of fronts and armies.

Ivan Terent'yevich often was seen in front headquarters, where he traveled on assignment of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq, SHC], which always sent him where main events were occurring and where problems of organizing reliable communications were of special importance. In addition to the organization of communications Peresyarkin devoted much attention to providing troops with everything necessary and to studying and disseminating everything valuable and foremost.

I recall in connection with this the first meeting with Hq, SHC representative Lt Gen Sig Trps I. T. Peresyarkin at Stalingrad, when I was chief of communications of the Stalingrad 3d Guards Corps. I recall the attention with which he regarded requests of commanders and staffs, including of course the signalmen's requests. After his visit we received trained replacements and the necessary communications equipment.

He was a man of few words and didn't like to impose his opinion categorically. At the same time, he was able to inspire people to perform selfless labor and he was able to mobilize all efforts to accomplish the primary mission. A profound knowledge of the job, firm will, an ability to work with people, and a demanding and attentive attitude toward them are the qualities which distinguished Peresyarkin.

I remember my meetings with Ivan Terent'yevich during the period of preparation for the Belorussian Offensive Operation. At that time he had an especially large amount of work. The troops of four fronts were taking part in Operation Bagration, and this is an enormous mass of tanks, aircraft, artillery and engineer troops. To ensure their precise coordination we had to organize reliable communications among them. Being a Headquarters representative, Peresyarkin gave this special attention. Anticipating difficulties in providing for command and control, he conducted a comprehensive inspection of the organization of communications in all the fronts, with special attention given to personnel training and logistical support of the signal subunits and

units. Suffice it to say that 27,000 radios were used in the Belorussian Operation. Radio equipment did not have such extensive use in a single one of the preceding operations.

Many toilers of military communications covered themselves with unfading glory in the Belorussian Operation together with representatives of other combat arms, and great credit for this goes to Peresyphkin. In providing the leadership with military and state communications, he performed extensive work to increase the stability of communications of the Hq, SHC and General Staff with the fronts and armies and he made a significant contribution to the development and production of communications equipment and the supply of that equipment to the troops.

Mar Sig Trps I. T. Peresyphkin (this military rank was conferred on him on 21 February 1944) made an inestimable contribution to the development of military communications and an improvement in command and control of the Armed Forces. He always had a very responsible, imaginative attitude toward the job for his part and demanded the very same attitude of his assistants. The introduction of personal radios for front and army commanders and for corps and division commanders, the organization of radio communications to one command level lower, the organization of a wire communications axis, centralized use of radio communications according to the principle of radio buros, and the organization of communications centers of mobile control points--these and many other innovations became widespread in the Great Patriotic War with the active participation of Ivan Terent'yevich.

While heading up the Soviet Army Signal Troops in the postwar years, Peresyphkin put in much work to improve their training and combat capabilities. From April 1958 until the end of his life Mar Sig Trps Peresyphkin was a military inspector-adviser of the USSR Ministry of Defense Inspectors-General Group. He penned many military-scientific works, among them the books "...A v boyu yeshche vazhney" [...And Even More Important in Combat], "Voyennaya radio-svyaz'" [Military Radio Communications], "Svyaz' v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Communications in the Great Patriotic War], "Radio -- mogucheye sredstvo oborony strany" [Radio: A Powerful Means of National Defense] and many articles.

Peresyphkin's services to the Motherland and the Armed Forces were recognized with four orders of Lenin, the Order of October Revolution, two orders of Red Banner, the orders of Kutuzov 1st Class, Red Star and "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class; with many medals; as well as with foreign orders.

Peresyphkin's life is a vivid example of selfless service to the people, the party cause and the socialist Motherland.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

APPLICATION ANNOUNCEMENT FOR CHERNIGOV AVIATION SCHOOL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 84 p 4

[Text] Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Leninskiy Komsomol announces admission to 1st Year Class.

Males from among civilian youth and soldiers and sergeants of all branches of arms, from 17 to 21 years of age in the year of entry, having completed secondary education, medically suitable for flight duty on jet aircraft, and who have passed the competitive entrance examinations are accepted.

Applications are sent to the military commissariat at place of residence until 30 April. Military personnel send a request through channels.

Entrance examinations are from 1-30 July in mathematics (written and oral), physics (oral), and Russian language and literature (composition).

Detailed information about the rules of admission may be obtained at military commissariats, unit headquarters or from the school administration.

In the absence of an allocation order, military commissariats until 1 June and troop unit commanders until 15 April send candidates' documents directly to the school. Candidates are provided free transport and meals.

The term of study is four years.

Graduates are awarded the military rank of lieutenant, are presented an all-union diploma with conferment of the qualification of pilot-engineer and a chest badge signifying completion of a higher military educational institution.

School address: 250003, Chernigov, Post Office 3.

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